TENJIKU AS THE CENTRE OF HEAVEN – SPACE POLICY ANALYSIS OF INDIA AND JAPAN

AUTHOR - SAMYUKTA IYER*

EDITOR- SHUVASMITA NANDA

ABSTRACT

The Asia Pacific region is a hotbed for space technology innovation. A number of nations are newly entering the realm of space and there is a constant drive to develop more effective indigenous space programs. Among these nations, Japan has maintained its position as a world leader. From being the only Asian participant in the International Space Station (ISS) to constructing well-rounded plans for the sustained commercialization of the space sector, Japan has left no stone unturned. India too has a rich history of space research and technology development; an ambitious space program with the current goal of a manned spaceflight by 2022. With cost-effective launches of indigenous technology, India has become a low-cost space power and a destination for satellite launch. This paper attempts to trace the origin and evolution of both the Indian and Japanese space programs through the statutes enacted in each country. It progresses to map out the possible areas of collaboration and policy innovation that would ensure prosperity for both the countries and the wider region.

INTRODUCTION

Since the late nineties, Japan has been dominating the realm of space in Asia through strategic internal and international cooperation. The recently launched stellar satellites, indigenous space exploration mission, and the fact that Japan is the only Asian country to be a part of the International Space Station (ISS) program only cements its position as a world leader. However, the journey to this prime was neither linear nor smooth. Major policy changes had to be considered to merely imagine Japanese utilization of space.

The general unease regarding the United States’ military alacrity provided Japan with the impetus to build a more self-reliant route to national security. As of now, Tokyo is still highly dependent on Washington, and this alliance is one of its strongest shields against Chinese and North Korean attacks. Even so, it was only rational that Tokyo came to take the steps necessary to move from a stagnant non-military space plan to one that allowed the non-offensive use of space for national security in order to attain some level of autonomy. Plans to inaugurate its very own military space unit were sown in 2020[1]. In fact, there have been talks of converting the Air Self-Defense Forces to Air and Space Self-Defense Forces[2]. However, this position is far from the weaponization of space. The current structure allows just enough utilization to ensure the holistic and efficient working of the Self-Defence Forces (SDF).

India has also consistently established itself to be a strong spacefaring nation in Asia. The Indian Space Programme (ISP) is unlike any other in the way that its motivations lie not in military restructuring or national esteem but solely through a mission-focused approach that would best benefit its population. The objective of the space program is very clearly summarized by the undisputed father of Indian space activities, Vikram Sarabhai, that there was no fantasy of competing with first-world nations in the race to the moon or planets or manned spaceflight. However, in order to play an active role in national and international community building, India must be the finest in the application of advanced technology for problem-solving[3].

Built on this foundation, the program has progressed in leaps and bounds since the country attained independence in 1947; so much so that it was entirely with indigenous technology that India was able to launch Chandrayaan-1, its first successful unmanned mission to the moon in 2007. Since then, India has engaged in space missions that do not particularly align with any national goal – their moon and more recently, their mars orbiter missions. Although India seems to have built a holistic space program in the last six decades, it is still more tailored to fit developmental needs with not nearly as much focus on the utilization of space for defense. The recent threats from Pakistan and China have alerted India but a robust space policy that introduces space as one of the strongest facets of national security would be extremely beneficial to India.

The first section of this paper attempts to trace the evolution of the Japanese space program, from using space for nothing but “peaceful purposes” to pursuing a full-fledged range of activities in space. The second traces the Indian journey through specific statues. The final section explores possible routes of collaboration in the realm of space between the two countries.

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF JAPANESE SPACE LAW

We start with the Outer Space Treaty which was ratified by Japan in 1967. The treaty precludes the establishment of military bases, installations, and fortifications on celestial bodies, but does not expressly prohibit the use of outer space for “military” purposes[4]. This observation is important as when other first-world spacefaring countries were already exploring military and security use of space by means of this provision, it still seemed like a distant dream to Japan.

Japan’s actual venture into space and its utilization started in 1969 with the Resolution of Principles of Japan’s Space Development and Utilization (1969 plan). This accord limited Japan’s space policy to be for “peaceful purposes” only[5]. Non-aggression is the hallmark of peace, which would still allow for countries to accrete military capabilities. The Japanese definition, however, held peaceful purposes to mean non-aggressive and non-military, which limited space activities to the civilian sector to develop civilian technologies only[6]. It was purely for this purpose in the start that on the recommendation of their advisory body, Japan set up the National Space Development Agency (NASDA) to send satellites into orbit.

How did they do this? For nearly four decades prior to 2003, the U.S. and Japan had conflicting philosophies on space policy. The United States has had trouble finding balance between effectively using collaborative space research to garner allies and holding back just enough to guarantee a return on investing this space technology in countries like Japan. The obvious concerns regarding the weakening of Japan if it had access to American technology meant that Japan dabbled between indigenous development and collaboration.

Hence, this question arises while we consider the first US-Japan Security Treaty signed in 1951 that prohibited Japan from developing any aerospace technology. Besides this ban, the United States was allowed to place troops on Japanese soil but were exempt of guaranteeing any support to Japan if the country was under attack[7]. Understandably, the treaty drew instant criticism owing to the disadvantaged position that Japan was pushed to occupy, and a call for revision was made the very next year, in 1952. This effort was not recognized until 1960 when finally, a more balanced Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan (also second US-Japan Security Treaty) was signed in 1960.

With the increased room that the revised treaty provided, Japan began to develop and launch satellites through three Exchange of Notes Concerning Cooperation in Space Exploration with the United States, in 1969, 75, and 80[8]. This meant that America would provide unclassified technology, pushing Japan to develop launch vehicles and place a heavier satellite in a higher orbit without the latter having to develop any independent technology. Japan soon launched its first satellite Ohsumi and subsequently two more launch vehicles, N and Q, in the same decade, using American technology. This exchange of technology happened despite concerns regarding possible military proliferation owing to the dual purpose (satellites and missiles) of the launch vehicles developed by Japan[9].

The principles of the 1969 plan were enshrined in the next 1978 Fundamental Policy of Japan’s Space Activities with the main goal of widening the scope of and promoting space applications in non-military areas such as communication, broadcasting, global positioning, and weather forecasting. Japan went as far as cutting down its defense spending to just under one percent of its GNP to clip militarization[10]. The late eighties, however, saw a slight deviation from this dependence. Japan opted to independently design the H-1 rocket to succeed the American backed N-2 rocket. Two years later, Japan set to develop H-2, the next generation of launch vehicles. This was by far the most ambitious venture as it had the capacity to launch a two-ton payload to a geostationary orbit without having to depend on the States[11]. The failure of this vehicle successfully brought around H-2A and H-2B which proved to be their primary launch vehicles until H-3 was developed in 2020.

The rapid development of Japanese capability was backed by a closed market that protected local aerospace technology manufacturers. Amidst the friction caused by this deviation coupled with rapidly souring trade relations and American accusations of deliberate market stagnation by the Japanese, the two countries signed the Exchange of Notes concerning the Policy and Procedure of R&D and Procurement of Artificial Satellites. Accordingly, Japan agreed to expand competition in satellite procurement by allowing foreign bidders access to non-R&D satellites[12], thus building a transparent, level playing field on a non-discriminatory basis.

As the decade progressed, Japan and the US forged several agreements concerning space policy. The Agreement between the United States and Japan Concerning Cross-Waiver of Liability for Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Space for Peaceful Purposes signed in 1995 dealt with the extent of liability when it came to space technology[13]. However, it was not revolutionary enough so as to transform the relationship between the two countries.

LEADING UP TO THE BASIC SPACE LAW 2008

The obvious next step in terms of regulation would be the Basic Space Law which the Japanese Diet enacted in 2008. However, contextualization by discussing the events that led up to this establishment is vital. The first trigger would essentially be Nodong-1 and Taepodong-1, two missiles from North Korea. While Nodong-1 barely reached Japan, Taepodong-1 not only reached the mainland but flew right over it, displaying increased missile range from North Korea. As a response, Japan and the USA developed the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system in 1998 and it was introduced by the Japanese government in 2003[14].

The development and use caused some friction because the BMD system was space technology of military character, which was operated by Japan’s military, the Self-defence forces (SDF). Being a measure taken to actively intercept ballistic missiles, the BMD system was the first strategic military weapon that Japan seemed to possess since its defeat in World War II. Not only did this seem opposed to the 1969 plan but to the very constitution itself. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution pronounces that the people of the land have given up war not only as a means to resolve disputes but also as an inherent right of a sovereign state[15]. However, the government strongly emphasised on the defensive nature of BMD holding that the renunciation of war did not impose an automatic restriction against self-defense[16].

While ballistic missiles could potentially be headed to Japan, their target would still be unclear at the time of the deployment of the BMD system. At a time like this, justifying the actions of the SDF as self-defence would be impossible. Hence, to eliminate the risk of attack while adhering to the constitution, “peaceful purposes” mentioned in the 1969 plan was reinterpreted from “non-military” to “non-offensive,” and the SDF was allowed to practice deployment under the surveillance of the civilian sector[17].

The second push was the argument that exchange of information between the USA and Japan was unconstitutional. Once again, at the time, Article 9 prohibited the SDF from fighting beside the US i.e., Collective Self-Defense (CSD) unless the very being of Japan was under attack[18]. Exchange of information would equal extending support to offensive strategy in one way and hence, amounting to CSD. Why does information exchange even come into question? This is because during the first missile contact, Japan did not have any indigenous information gathering methods and was solely reliant on the US to detect missiles that approached Japan in order to deploy the BMD system[19]. This argument gained traction after America had entirely failed to communicate to Japan that Taepodong-1 had flown over the country in 1998, placing the country in a blind spot[20].

Despite this argument being dismissed, the government launched two Information-gathering satellites (IGSs) in 2003. It was again argued that these satellites were not offensive assets under the 1969 plan but rather aids to the activities of the SDF[21]. In addition, satellites could also be used by other sectors besides the military, removing its exclusivity. The third one was launched in 2007 with which Japan completed its satellite network. These Japanese satellites were not registered with the UN prior to the Basic Space Law despite Japan's 1983 signature of the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space. This was apparently done for security reasons as the specifics of the satellites could not be made public. Tokyo went as far as to justify this non-compliance through the existence of unregistered American and European satellites[22]. This flimsy reasoning along the government not addressing the rumor's of these satellites being “spy satellites” casted doubt on the true intention of these launches.

The third reason, overwhelming security shocks, might justify the launch of these satellites as well as the abrupt switch in the Japanese stance on space. North Korea launched no less than seven ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan in 2006[23]. The next year China developed a non-kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) just as Japan was finalizing its comprehensive space plan. The ASAT in a test obliterated one of Japan’s weather satellites, littering the lower Earth orbit in debris[24]. The sudden attack not only warned Japan of its neighbor's satellite destruction capabilities but also rendered it vulnerable to cyberattacks, jamming, spoofing and other threats. In fact, that threat is still very imminent; the MoD even revealed in a 2019 report that Chinese ASAT missiles, killer satellites, and laser weapons were the top-priority threats to Japanese space technology[25]. Besides foreign attack, SSA is obviously helpful in steering satellites clear of debris.

BASIC SPACE LAW OF 2008 AND MAJOR RESTRUCTURING OF THE LAW

Here is where the Basic Space Law of 2008 comes in. The watershed law is a clear move away from the previous science-focused space policy because for the first time, it centralized space development. This means that the various sectors of the government could put forth their own space objectives as long as they “enhance the quality of life of the nation, ensure national security, and international contribution and cooperation.”[26] Finally, the leaps of progress that Japan had made in the research and development of space technology could be streamlined to fit the national strategy.

The new law lead to two major developments. First, the Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy was set up, headed by the Prime Minister with the participation of all Cabinet Ministers. Initially, Japan’s three top-tier space institutions had been merged to form the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) in 2003. However, JAXA still came under the purview of the Ministry of Education and Technology (MEXT). As per its mandate, the state-of-the-art space technologies could only be utilised for further scientific research and development. This transfer moved space-related decision making away from the MEXT to the Cabinet itself, allowing the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and SDF to use, own, and operate space systems for security and defence purposes in line with the Outer Space Treaty as well as Japan’s pacifist values. In fact, the 2018-2024 mid-term plan released by JAXA registers national security as its top priority, a long call away from its standard R&D purpose[27].

Second, Article 14 of the statute allowed for the use of space to supplement the existing national security of Japan. As a result of this new interpretation, Japan could develop and launch space technology in a manner that fully adheres to the “non-offensive” principle while still collecting the required intelligence and early-warning signs. Article 15 emphasized the need for the State to have the capability to independently develop, launch, track, and operate artificial satellites and so on.

Under the law, the Basic Plan on Space Policy was laid down in 2009 and has been revised thrice in 2013, 2015 and 2020. The initial plan focused heavily on the use of space for security and recognised that Japan was at a serious disadvantage owing to its late entry into the military realm of space. It was believed that the information gathering ability of commercial satellites was far inferior to the standard required for defence-oriented use of space[28]. This was reflected in the 2010 National Defence Program Guidelines (NDPG) which called for strengthening information gathering and communication functions in outer space. Additionally, the 2013 National Security Strategy promoted the use of space to further the interests of national security and pushed for Space Situational Awareness (SSA)[30]. Considering that Japan’s strategy is to be non-offensive, it is crucial that they are entirely aware of the space activities that will directly or indirectly affect them. This is precisely why SSA or the knowledge of and the capability to detect objects in space, both natural and man-made, assessing their threat-level, and dealing with them appropriately has been pivotal to the Japanese space programme.

With the foundation for space activities having been laid, Japan began to look into the possible avenues for privatization of space activities. Although it is a spacefaring nation, the lack of privatized space activities was one of the reasons it took so long for the country to come up with a national space legislation as encompassing as the Basic Space Law. It is understood that private entities would be willing to step into high-risk high-return space projects only if provided with enough assurance of security from the state[31]. The 1969 Plan that forbade military activities in space made it difficult to establish a healthy space industry under which the private business sector could flourish; the private space industry was barely active in Japan until 2008. Superbird-7, the first private communications satellite it launched commercially, was launched in August 2008.

This is when commercialisation of space tech took off when specific rockets were transferred from the JAXA to the private Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), and it successfully conducted the launch of Superbird-7. Like this, there were several other international deals which made both launch and manufacturing speedy.

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE INDIAN SPACE PROGRAMME

The Indian journey begins with the establishment of the Indian National Committee for Space Research (INCOSPAR) under the Department of Atomic Energy in 1962. INCOSPAR restricted itself to scientific research with the objective of developing an autonomous means of space exploration and making its benefits accessible to the Indian population. It was under the INCOSPAR that the Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching Station (TERLS), India’s very first launch station, was set up to in 1963 to launch the U.S. made, French payload carrying Nike-Apache rocket. Throughout the sixties, TERLS would prove to be instrumental in the international launch of sounding rockets required for the understanding the equatorial electrojet[32]. The then heads of the ISP were well aware that the utilisation of space would not require indigenous satellites at the very start. Thus, the Experimental Satellite Communication Earth Station (ESCES) was opened in 1967 at Ahmedabad to begin application development with foreign satellites.

Shortly after, in 1969, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) came into being to replace INCOSPAR. ISRO too was explicitly mandated to utilize space technology only for furthering national socio-economic goals. Coincidentally, the Japanese 1969 plan and ISRO began in the same year and had similar restrictions and objectives of space technology for civilian benefit. However, the most recent Chandrayaan and Mangalyaan missions are a trend in a direction away from this strict mandate. Seeing this wing flourish, the government founded the Department of Space (DOS) as well as the Space Commission in 1972. These three organs are all part of a well-oiled machine – the Space Commission is responsible for formulating and DOS is responsible for executing policy, owing to the lack of a centralized statute governing use of space in India. ISRO functions as the primary agency for space research and development required to buttress space policy.

In its nascent stages ISRO mainly dabbled in remote sensing and communication, only investing in such technology that would prove beneficial for the daily working of its civilian population. With this backdrop, ISRO launched the Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (SITE) which was hailed to be the largest sociological experiment in the world in the mid-seventies[33]. This marked the first of the three phases of the ISP – concept demonstration[34]. The SITE program provided each village with a television set which ran educational programs broadcasted through a geosynchronous satellite. These programs were carefully curated for the village population and ran for a year, reaching close to 200,000 people in 2400 villages nationwide[35]. Although the satellite used was the American Technology Satellite (ATS-6), the program proved more beneficial than any ‘Western-style’ use of space[36].

The success of this project spurred India to create and launch an Indian-made satellite. Aryabhata, India’s first satellite was built locally and launched by the Soviet Union in 1975. It was succeeded by the second phase of the ISP – experimentation. Experimental observation satellites – Bhaskara I, Bhaskara II, and experimental geostationary satellite APPLE, were launched through specialized launch vehicles like SLV-3. The experimental phase was also characterized by a display of ‘end-to-end’ capability rooted in Sarabhai motto of self-reliance. This meant that design, development, and management of space and ground systems would all be done within the country using indigenous technology.

These launches gave way to the 3-pronged program followed by ISRO in the late seventies – the Indian National Satellite (INSAT) series, the Indian Remote Sensing Satellite (IRS) series and the Indian Launch Vehicle program[37]. The INSAT-1 and INSAT-2 series brought sweeping changes in the way India communicated, utilized disaster warning systems and carried out rescue missions. It was so successful that the INSAT series is thought to be one of the largest, most efficient chains of domestic multipurpose satellites in the Asia-Pacific region[38]. The current system has more than 200 transponders covering several frequency bands, including C, extended C and Ku[39]. India also boasts the largest network of remote sensing satellites in the form of the IRS. They are the fruits of the labour of focusing on remote sensing as a pivotal area since the beginning of the ISP. These satellites provide high-grade imagery of the Earth in multiple spectral bands.

In the late eighties, just as Japan was beginning to move away from total dependence on America in terms of development of launch vehicles, India too was making a move towards indigenous development. This would mark the third phase of the ISP – operation. India revealed a number of launch vehicles, the most noteworthy being the Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) and the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV). The GSLV defrayed India's dependence on foreign launch vehicles and allowed for INSAT-like satellites to be launched into geostationary orbit on its own. Even the usual ally – Soviet Union – was asked to sit this one out. The PSLV is the current model in use, having completed close to 50 missions as of 2019[40]. These include the highly celebrated Chandrayaan-1 in 2007 and Mangalyaan in 2013. Fascinatingly, there are even talks of ISRO attempting to build reusable launch vehicles (RLVs) – Avatar Scramjet[41].

INDIA AND MILITARIZATION OF SPACE

India’s position on the military use of space is quite similar to the Japanese stance. India has always condemned the militarization of space and has maintained that the utilisation of space must be for peaceful purposes alone. The then Prime Minister affirmed in 1968 at the UN that peaceful use of space, especially for communication and meteorology, is the most secure way forward for a developing nation like India[42]. She confirmed India’s intention to fashion “a new pattern of international behavior” rooted in cooperation and mutual respect[43].

India strongly condemned both the Strategic Defense Initiative (‘Star Wars program’) whereby the United States aimed to build a ballistic missile defense system, and the Cold War ASAT testing conducted by the USA and USSR. India even pushed for the prevention of an “arms race in outer space”[44] and going so far as to sponsor a declaration with six other countries opposing any semblance of an arms race or nuclear testing in space[45]. The foundation for this stance essentially lay in strong notions of sovereignty and morality attached to India’s security strategy. The effort to minimize the number of direct broadcast satellites as well as advocating for a non-discriminatory form of universal disarmament are all reflective of this[46].

The 2000s brought with it a deviation from this rigid stance of non-militarization. First, the establishment of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1987 made it difficult for ISRO to procure foreign launch vehicle technology. Moreover, sanctions were placed on India by the United States just as a deal had been closed with Russia for the acquirement of cryogenic engine technology. It was only after its first nuclear test in 1998 did India tighten its export conditions, easing previously placed sanctions.

Second, India’s neighbors began accreting military capabilities in space technology with China developing its non-kinetic ASAT and strategically forming economic alliances across Asia. The most alarming of these allies was Pakistan who by way of this alliance had acquired nuclear and missile capabilities. India was pushed to develop its missile defense system in the nineties over these growing security threats.

Most recently, the establishment of a tri-service Defense Space Agency has been announced. The agency would use cutting edge research, imagery, and satellite control to assess and neutralize threats in space. A predecessor to this was the Integrated Space Cell instituted in 2008 under the Ministry of Defense to cater to the growing need for information gathering in space. The cell would go on to launch an exclusive satellite for the defense workings of the Indian Navy in 2013 and the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS) in 2016 amongst others. In early 2019, India successfully tested a kinetic kill ASAT of its own, one which had been underway for six years prior.

WHY DOES INDIA REQUIRE A LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR SPACE?

Sustainability is the ultimate goal of any program and in terms of space technology, the entry of private entities would be the only way to prevent stagnation and promote innovation. It can be argued that just like in the case of Japan before 2008, India did not have the need for a national space legislation owing to the lack of non-state players in the space sector. The private sector in the ISP is restricted to manufacture of components utilised by ISRO. The serious consideration of private actors playing a more central role in the ISP is a very new emergence. A national space legislation serves three primary purposes – implementing international treaties, promoting space as a national project, and tailoring policies to combat weaknesses present in international law or even those unique to the country[47].

The need to adhere to an international treaty provides the state with an impetus to enact relevant national laws since the existence of national structures to ensure adherence is implied at the time of signing. In India, this adherence stems from Article 51 of the Constitution. The article directs the state to place international peace and security as an important objective and holds that one of the means to achieve this is by fostering respect for international law and treaty obligations[48]. Article 51 is supplemented by Article 53 which vests the executive power of the Union in the President. Since this article allows for the delegation of executive power by the President[49], international treaty obligations are usually fulfilled through executive action rather than through pre-existing legislation. Although the lack of national legislation in itself does not attract any sanctions, Courts would still be inclined in favor of national laws if they were to contradict international law. Such a structure in India would establish legal rights pertaining to entities operating in space along with a system to claim compensation in case of damage[50].

While a lot can be achieved through executive action, there lie a few exceptions to Article 51 under which a pre-existing national legislation is required for compliance with international treaties. The most relevant are if adherence to the treaty is directly related to the rights of an Indian citizen[51] or if adherence requires giving up the right to life or liberty, personal property or such rights that can be modified only through legislation[52]. These exceptions may get triggered while enforcing instruments such as the 1968 Rescue Agreement which India has acceded to.

The lack of legislation currently does not mean that no efforts were made to streamline activities in space. In 2017, a draft bill aimed at commercialization of space activities was released by the DOS. The pivot of the Draft Space Activities Bill is the creation of a regulatory structure for space activities, backed by the recognized objectives of space exploration – peaceful purposes and national security. The draft bill envisions a method to regulate private space activities and facilitate the registration of space objects. This it does by granting the government with extensive rights and strict rules against launch of unauthorized objects. With the introduction of such an anticipated legislation India would finally be on the same plane as other spacefaring nations.

While this did seem like a good initiative, the bill was far too broad to have a real effect on India’s space sector. There was no clear mention of liability and possible economic support from the government. The Indian space market has seemed to attract a number of players but with major concerns regarding cost. Economic stability is the strongest foundation for privatisation which the draft bill fails to provide. Japan is an excellent example in this regard as their current Space Activities Act provides government support in terms of financial grants required by commercial space launch operators, such as by arranging third-party liability insurance coverage[53]. Although the bill has now lapsed, there is room for the government to take in considerations and draft a more relevant one.

POSSIBLE ROUTES FOR THE FUTURE THROUGH COLLABORATION WITH JAPAN

Japan and India are quite similar in their space journey – they start with the civilian use of space and later progress to a more holistic program that approaches space from a variety of perspectives. In doing so, both powers have made considerable progress in developing and pursuing robust technological missions. However, the ultimate object of utilizing space for the benefit of the common man stays pivotal to both programs. A fairly new and common goal for the two is the commercialization of space, although Japan is slightly ahead in this regard.

Collaboration between Japan and India in the space industry can be particularly fruitful for both the individual countries as well as the Asia Pacific region in general. In the most recent Japan-India Summit, Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and Prime Minister Suga Yoshihide recognised that bilateral cooperation in the fields of security and economy are vital in achieving a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”[54] Active initiatives such as the UOT-NIAS joint space policy research must be boosted as it gives India the opportunity to share the wealth of knowledge that Japan has acquired through planetary exploration missions as well as being an active member of the ISS. Such an initiative would help identify factors unique to the region that may adversely affect space-related activities.

An immensely valuable area of collaboration would be satellite positioning systems. The Indian IRNSS and the Japanese QZSS are both technologically sophisticated. However, the reach that both these systems have is very limited to their immediate regions. Working together would prove efficient and profitable for both parties.

CONCLUSION

India and Japan have historically rich space programs that allow them to assess and adapt as times change. The two have matured to efficiently cater to their population while pursuing a full range of activities in space. The current objective is to sustain this efficacy by opening up to commercialisation. So far, cooperation between the countries has been extremely profitable and resulted in the development of the Asia Pacific region. Only time will tell the heights that the two powers can reach in the realm of space.

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32. Martand Jha, Fifty years of TERLS, The Hindu, March 1, 2018. Fifty years of Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching Station - The Hindu

33. Department of Space, Indian Space Research Organisation, Genesis. Genesis - ISRO

34. Yuichiro Nagai, Policy Analysis: Space Programmes of Japan and India, 66th International Astronautical Congress, Jerusalem, Israel, 8, October 15

35. Supra note 33.

36. George Greenstein, A Gentleman of the Old School: Homi Bhabha and the Development of Science in India, 61 AM. SCHOLAR 409, 414, 1992.

37. Supra note 34.

38. Rajeshwari Pillai Rajagopalan, India’s Space Program: International Cooperation and Evolution, Asie Visions, Centre for Asian Studies, 111, 9, December 2019.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Rajeshwari Rajagopalan, India’s Space Program: A Chronology, India Review, October 2011.

42. C. Jayaraj, Secretary General, ISIL, India’s Space Policy, and Institutions, Proceedings, United Nations/ Republic of Korea Workshop on Space Law, United Nations Treaties on Outer Space: Actions at the National Level, New York, 2004.

43. Ibid.

44. India Opposes SDI, Strategic Digest, Vol.15, No.10, 1304, October 1985.

45. R.P. Rajagopalan, India’s Changing Policy of Space Militarization: The Impact of China’s ASAT Test, India Review, 354-378, November 2011.

46. Supra note 38 p. 11.

47. Supra note 31.

48. INDIA CONST. art. 51.

49. INDIA CONST. art. 53.

50. Ranjana Kaul, Ram Jakhu, Regulation of Space Activities in India, June 2010.

51. Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel v. Union Of India 1969 AIR 783.

52. Mirza Ali Akbar Kashani v. United Arab Republic1966 AIR 230.

53. Hiroko Yotsumoto, Daiki Ishikawa, Japan, The Space Law Review, 17 December 2020.

54. Japan-India Summit Telephone Talk, March 9, 2021. Japan-India Summit Telephone Talk | Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (mofa.go.jp)

The Author is a 2nd-year LLB (Hons) student at O.P. Jindal Global University.

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